C an structural realism provide a satisfactory explanation for China's foreign policy? China scholars have often criticized the work of social scientists, especially those relying on abstract theories, for ignoring the special features of the Chinese case.
a particular state's behavior (e.g., its foreign policy) will be incomplete and often misleading if the analyst ignores causes intentionally set aside for the purposes of crafting a parsimonious systems theory.
2 That including a host of such causes-the personality of state leaders, parochial political interests of government bureaucrats, ideology, and domestic social, economic, and political structures-helps provide a fuller account of the foreign policy choices particular states make, is not proof of neorealism's fatal flaw, but rather another demonstration of some simple methodological points. A theory is an attempt to depict an aspect of the real world through abstraction and simplification; in making sense of its chosen domain of inquiry, every theory has a limited range of application; a theory with a wider range of application is more useful or powerful, but even a powerful theory provides only a partial account of reality. The example frequently cited to make the last point, makes it well. Newtonian mechanics is a powerful body of theory (whose limits modern physicists eventually exposed). Nevertheless, although its attraction provide a compelling explanation as to why leaves fall to the ground rather than ascend to the heavens, they are of little use in understanding the different paths followed by leaves as opposed to apples. 4 To explain such differences, of course, requires drawing on other theories that focus on aspects of the physical world that were set aside by Newton. The usefulness of aerodynamics for explaining the path of falling bodies complements rather than contradicts Newton's insights about gravitational attraction. Engineers, engaged in applied as opposed to theoretical science, draw on and combine the insights that abstract and simplified disciplinary research provides. One should expect it to be likewise with the study of China's foreign policy. In analyzing a specific empirical case, one is engaged in applied science, not theoretical science. Thus, to restate the point made earlier, the question is not whether neorealism can explain China's foreign policy, but rather how much of the explanation can the international-structural causes it highlights provide?
The obvious but not very informative answer is that the significance of international-structural as opposed to national and subnational causes has varied over time. The Chinese case is intriguing, however, because of the remarkable extent to which structural constraints can account for the broad contours of Beijing's foreign policy during the Cold War, and the extent to which their constraining influence was usually evident despite strong reasons (i.e., the presence of nonstructural causes) to expect China to behave otherwise. China's early post-Cold War foreign policy demonstrates, by contrast, that although international-structural causes continue to shape Beijing's
